I Introduction
This paper examines how the United States avoided a banking panic in 1914 despite threatening circumstances following the initial stages of World War I. During the summer of 1914, the U.S. suffered gold outflows, Europe was at war, blockades threatened world trade, and cash was soon to become scarce. Following the actions of worldwide stock exchanges, the New York Stock Exchange was closed on July 31, 1914, isolating banks from their main market for financial liquidity. Although the closure of the stock exchange may have helped forestall the impending financial crisis by preventing mass sell-offs of securities and the related (and feared) outflow of gold, the shutdown also exposed the financial system to the risk of a liquidity
shortage. In New York City, two liquidity provision mechanisms, Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency and clearing house loan certificates, became crucial stop gap measures to prevent vulnerable financial markets from spiraling into a full-scale panic.
We investigate this episode because crisis prevention mechanisms employed before an active Federal Reserve System were able to support deposit levels and thus promote the growth of the aggregate money supply, an outcome consistent with standard policy prescriptions for combating financial distress. There is a widely held perception that powerful market participants and policymakers engaged in a successful intervention to prevent the occurrence of a far more damaging financial event. Existing literature lauds the successful outcome in 1914 as the result of the issuance of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency, which made its simultaneous debut and exit in 1914. In New York City in particular, clearing house loan certificates may still have been an important liquidity resource, even though, on their own, clearing house loan certificate issues were unable to prevent full-scale banking panics and financial crises in 1907, 1893, and 1873.
We show that the financial intermediaries in New York City that requested emergency liquidity loans through these two mechanisms were able to maintain (or increase) their level of deposits and hence staved off a contraction in the money supply. 1 We examine data on the issues of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency and clearing house loan certificates in New York City institutions which identify the borrower and quantity requested for each type of temporary liquidity measure. We combine these data with high-frequency (weekly) balance sheet data to verify how temporary liquidity borrowing affected changes in deposits.
By borrowing liquidity instruments, we find that banks are generally able to maintain interbank payments despite initial cash drains to the interior and large gold outflows arising from asset liquidations by foreign investors. We base these inferences on direct comparisons of the characteristics of the financial distress in 1914 with previous National Banking Era panics, namely those in 1907, 1893, 1890, 1884, and 1873 . These earlier instances of financial distress employed only clearing house loan certificates as a temporary liquidity mechanism because emergency currency did not exist as an alternative. Several features of 1914 play out differently, and more favorably, compared to these prior crises, which implies that emergency currency played a crucial role in alleviating the financial distress. By examining the use of clearing house loan certificates in 1914, we suggest that they played a secondary, but still consequential, role in forestalling financial panic. Furthermore, our data and statistical examination reveals that financial intermediaries borrowing solely Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency and, separately, those borrowing only clearing house loan certificates are associated with a net increase in deposits that is larger than the net deposit increase among those 1 Our empiric analysis focuses on the role of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency and clearing house loan certificates in New York City because New York City represented nearly half of the banking assets in the United States in 1914 and New York City institutions would have been acutely affected by the closure of the stock exchange.
4 intermediaries that did not borrow either form of temporary liquidity. Intermediaries that borrowed both emergency currency and clearing house loan certificates --a subset of national banks --experienced a net decline in deposits. We suspect that this observation indicates that these institutions required additional liquidity most intensively. 2 Examining the borrowing characteristics of 1914 --the evolution of deposits and currency --and comparing them to data measured during previous crisis episodes, we suggest that the extensive provision of temporary credit to a wide array of financial intermediaries was essential to the successful alleviation of financial distress in 1914. Although the innovation of emergency currency was crucial in preventing a panic in 1914, they were only available to national banks -a subset of financial institutions. Clearing house loan certificates, however, were available to trust companies and state banks that were members of the New York Clearing House and were borrowed by a subset of national banks in addition to emergency currency. As a result, the private (and perceived as inferior) form of temporary liquidity in the form of clearing house loan certificates may have a secondary yet still palliative role that may have been previously overlooked.
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II Background
The motivation for our historical comparison arises from both the existing literature which examines the 1914 crisis and the aggregate effects of the liquidity provision mechanisms as well as the challenging circumstances facing the economy in 1914. The existing literature studies the successful alleviation of the financial distress and emphasizes the provision of emergency currency in 1914 as the key liquidity mechanism that prevented anything like the 2 Further work will investigate the institutional characteristics that generate this distinctive fact. 3 The Panic of 1907, in particular, demonstrated the importance of access to temporary liquidity when the isolation of trust companies from liquidity sources heightened the severity of trust depositor withdrawals (see Moen 1990, and Tallman 2000) .
Panic of 1907, 1893, or 1873 from arising. 4 Friedman and Schwartz (1963: 196) highlight how emergency currency enabled the US financial market to stabilize after the declarations of war in Europe. Silber (2007a) suggests that emergency currency produced an outcome --the increase in the money supply by seven percent --that clearing house loan certificates were unable to do on their own. In previous panics during the national banking era, the money supply declined, suggesting that the issuance of clearing house loan certificates failed to reverse the forces of contraction endemic to financial panic. We use our data set to investigate the details that underlie the successful outcome in 1914 and explore whether the palliative effects of clearing house loan certificates in this instance have been unnecessarily overlooked.
Clearing house loan certificates were loans issued by the New York Clearing House to member bank borrowers upon approval by the Clearing House Loan Committee, which hinged on its decision regarding the value of posted collateral by the borrowing bank. The certificates traded at par at the New York Clearing House, paid 6 percent interest to the holder, and were effectively guaranteed by the entire membership of the clearing house. Clearing house loan certificates substituted for specie and legal tender claims that were exchanged at the New York Clearing House to settle transactions balances between clearing house members. Members of the clearing house were obliged to accept them, and non-acceptance was grounds for expulsion from the clearing house association. Functionally, clearing house loan certificates freed up cash and other forms of lawful money to be paid out to depositors and corresponding banks without forcing the liquidation of bank assets (or collapsing the size of balance sheets System, a public entity, was the ultimate product of their travails.
Upon the discretion of the Secretary of Treasury, the Aldrich-Vreeland Act could be invoked allowing banks to post collateral at their local National Currency Association in exchange for emergency notes that were nearly indistinguishable from regular national bank notes and could be paid out as cash to depositors. The organizational structure was largely inspired by the clearing house system but with several key distinctions. While the original legislation stipulated that only national banks could be members of National Currency Association, the amendment allowed state banks and trusts the possibility of gaining access to emergency currency provided that they agreed to join the Federal Reserve System. 7 State banks and trusts for the most part declined membership, preventing them from directly borrowing emergency currency through the duration of the crisis. State banks and trust companies that were members of the New York Clearing House still had the opportunity to borrow clearing house loan certificates, which were essentially the next best option for temporary liquidity expansion.
Before we conclude that the two liquidity provision methods were substitutes, we point out that some national banks in our sample borrowed emergency currency as well as clearing house loan certificates, leading us to hypothesize that national banks found value in borrowing each form. 8 Timberlake (1984) and Gorton (1985) analyze the role of clearing house loan certificates as palliative mechanisms employed during panics of the National Banking Era. national bank notes. In the absence of verifiable and corroborated evidence to the contrary, we believe that emergency currency was not used as final payment at the New York Clearing House.
With evidence indicating national banks used clearing house loan certificates and emergency currency for distinct roles, our view is that the solution to the crisis in New York City in 1914 hinged on the combined issuance of temporary liquidity instruments. The institutional limitations and differing collateral requirements of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency described in Table 1 We attribute the benign circumstance in 1914 to the success of the temporary liquidity issues, which made suspension of payments unnecessary and prevented cash hoarding.
Specifically, we speculate that the provision of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency directly to interior banks reduced interior bank cash demands from correspondent banks in New York City and thereby attenuated the dysfunctional flow of cash from New York City banks to interior correspondents typical during crises.
By borrowing temporary liquidity, financial intermediaries prevented an undesirable contraction on the asset side of their balance sheet. The issues of clearing house loan certificates in previous National Banking Era panics were motivated by financial institutions wanting to avoid early liquidation of assets. These issues, however, were unable to prevent cash hoarding and the impositions of restrictions on the convertibility of deposits into cash in either 1893 or 1907. Figure 3 nearly 5 percent during the panic. In the empirical discussion that follows, we investigate whether the institutions that borrowed these liquidity measures display demand deposit changes different from institutions that did not borrow. We also investigate the changes in net deposits of banks who borrowed only clearing house loan certificates, only Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency, or both liquidity provisions.
III Data
We employ data measures from the Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency for 1915 that lists aggregate data on clearing house loan certificate issues and Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency for the entire United States as well as for specific National Currency
Associations, like New York City. 
IV Empirical Methods and Results
The premise for the empirical investigation centers on the idea that New York City financial institutions that borrowed either form of temporary liquidity were better able to continue their intermediation operations as a result. The temporary liquidity expansion enabled those banks to return cash to depositors and maintain clearing balances at the New York Clearing
House to a greater extent than otherwise. If those institutions that borrowed liquidity were better able to continue financial intermediation as a result of their borrowing, we expect that the institutions that borrowed either clearing house loan certificates or Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency should have maintained the level of deposits despite the onset of the financial crisis.
We pose a simple argument in support of this hypothesis. National banks borrow Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency (AVEC) to satisfy cash withdrawal demands from depositors allowing them to provide depositors with cash and simultaneously avoid reducing their legal cash reserves, which might force them to curtail lending or sell interest-bearing assets.
Curtailing lending or selling assets may contribute to an overall contraction in credit depending on the replacement (or not) of lending and on the source of the asset purchase (i.e., intermediated or not). Similarly, institutions that borrowed clearing house loan certificates --either state or national banks or trust companies --to offset adverse debit balances at the New York Clearing
House can satisfy those payment demands with what was effectively a temporary IOU so that legal tender balances would be unaltered by these transactions. In both cases, the preservation of legal tender balances (reserves) would put these institutions in a better position to maintain loans and deposit balances throughout the period of financial crisis.
Another argument centers on the availability of deposit balances and the avoidance of any form of payment restrictions or suspension. Depositors could be encouraged by the availability of balances in the form of cash when an institution requests AVEC. Although clearing house loan certificates were unable to increase the legal tender of a given bank, they had an indirect benefit to depositors by allowing banks to settle balances with other clearing members using the clearing house loan certificates. This action then freed up legal tender from settlement balances at the New York Clearing House to be allocated for other uses such as paying out cash to depositors and at the same time maintaining loan balances. deposits series, it is likely that clearing house loan certificates influence this increase. The comovement between the net deposits series and the total borrowing series 15 further supports our inference with respect to the relationship between the two balance sheet measures. As total 14 Net deposits are defined as: gross Deposits + unpaid dividends -(exchanges for Clearing House+ amounts due from all other banks + notes of other banks and checks on non clearing institutions). We attempt to compile a similar series from the Comptroller of the Currency data. 15 Total borrowing is the accumulated daily requests of clearing house loan certificates and Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency. For the emergency currency, we were unable to find record of cancellations except for aggregates at various intervals. We linearly interpolated the cancellation of emergency currency based on these select dates.
borrowing increases, net deposits increase as well. Likewise, when total borrowing decreases, net deposits also decline. We also notice that loans and investments 16 generally maintain a level similar to those of deposits except for the September 12, 1914 call date. Although loans, unlike net deposits, decline from August 1, 1914 to September 12, 1914, they increase from a local trough to surpass their August 1, 1914 level by December 5, 1914. This level increase after the crisis indicates that banking business faced a short-term shock but was otherwise able to recover.
In the same way Figure 2 indicated the absence of a persistent currency drain to the interior, Figure 5 highlights the absence of a large contraction in deposits. Furthermore, the chart uncovers a relationship between temporary liquidity borrowing and deposit changes that supports our main argument.
The observations in Figure 5 contrast sharply with the characteristic data for the National Banking Era financial crises (1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, and 1907 ) listed in Table 3 . The summary of facts in Table 3 indicate that measures of banking activity --both intermediation services (loans and deposits) as well as liquidity storage (specie and legal tenders) --contracted during most of the panics, especially those considered the most severe --1873, 1893, and 1907. The most notable contrast between Figure 5 data and the observations in Table 3 is that the aggregate level of net deposits in 1914 remains close to the August 1 level, whereas the net deposits aggregate falls below the pre-panic level at some point in all the previous National Banking Era panics, and in some cases, the contraction is substantial.
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The New York Clearing House halted publication of individual bank balance sheet data at the onset of market distress. As a result, we lack data on individual banks from August 1, 1914
to December 5, 1914. Instead, we track the aggregate evolution of net deposits and loans in Figure 6 , which plots net deposits and loans for national banks, state banks, and trusts that were members of the clearing house. Figures 5 and 6 show similar evolutions of the net deposits series and the loans and investments series throughout the crisis allowing us to use our sample data despite missing data on individual banks for a large portion of our sample. The lack of data for individual financial institutions over this interval prevents us from using the weekly data to do a time series or panel data analysis. In further work, we hope to exploit our data series more completely.
18 Table 4 percent. Given that financial intermediaries who borrowed only clearing house loan certificates or only emergency currency experienced deposit growth, it is unlikely that the deposit contraction observed in the group borrowing both instruments is an outcome of borrowing itself.
Rather, the borrowing of both types of temporary liquidity was likely a signal of financial distress and the observed contraction in net deposits indicated the need for liquidity of these national banks. Additionally, these intermediaries were all national banks and national banks in New York City held the majority of correspondent banker balances, which were typically the source of the funds that were lent in the call loan market. As a result, these large, correspondent banks would have likely experienced the most severe disruption of their banking operations as a result of the closure of the stock exchange and the initial withdrawals of deposits by their correspondent banks in the interior of the country.
V Discussion
During the panics of the National Banking Era, clearing house loan certificate issues were unable to produce an effective increase in the money supply. Figure 7 displays a schematic chart that illustrates how emergency currency and clearing house loan certificates were individually imperfect substitutes for legal tender. The combination of clearing house loan certificates and emergency currency formed a composite good that was a more complete substitute for legal tender money which was thus able to generate a temporary increase in the monetary base. From this perspective, the two forms of temporary liquidity provide a composite good that is a closer substitute for legal tender than either form alone because of the distinct purposes for which emergency currency and clearing house loan certificates could be employed.
We consider two additional elements illustrated in Table 1 that may influence the relative demands for emergency currency and clearing house loan certificate borrowing by national banks -1) the collateral requirements for the respective temporary liquidity instruments and 2) the relative cost of clearing house loan certificates to emergency currency.
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For national banks, emergency currency had more stringent collateral requirements than clearing house loan certificates and emergency currency was limited to 125 percent of surplus and capital, potentially limiting the supply of this form of liquidity to specific borrowers. As noted, we do not observe requests for emergency currency and clearing house loan certificates as taking place sequentially (e.g., first emergency currency, then clearing house loan certificates).
Instead, we suspect that a national bank could allocate its available collateral early in the crisis and take out liquidity in amounts that were tentatively and potentially sufficient for the duration of the financial distress. Table 1 indicates that the interest cost of emergency currency was 3 percent whereas the interest cost of clearing house loan certificates was 6 percent. Wicker (2005) argues that the interest cost alone should have removed any desire to take out clearing house loan certificates.
New York City national banks, however, took out a substantial quantity of clearing house loan certificates despite the obvious price advantage of borrowing emergency currency. Some advantages of clearing house loan certificates are that they did not have to be circulated immediately and would not accrue interest costs unless they were issued. Interest accrued to the holder of a CHLC and thus those costs were not incurred until a bank used a loan certificate to settle payments with another institution. In this regard, clearing house loan certificate requests were effectively an option for liquidity. Table 2 suggests that about 88 percent of clearing house loan certificates issued were eventually circulated, but the duration of the circulation is not available information. The main argument, though, remains pertinent --that the availability of liquidity in the form of clearing house loan certificates was valuable to New York City financial intermediaries.
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VI Conclusions
This paper emphasizes that the borrowing of clearing house loan certificates by New
York City financial institutions of all types in 1914 was substantial and important for the continuation of financial intermediation especially during the time when the New York Stock
Exchange was shut down. Emergency currency combined with clearing house loan certificates provided temporary liquidity to a wide range of financial institutions in New York City and thereby ensured that large financial institutions had access to some form of liquidity. We find that financial intermediaries borrowing emergency currency issues and clearing house loan certificates maintained and increased deposit levels relative to those banks that did not borrow.
While banks who borrowed both clearing house loan certificates and emergency currency experienced a contraction in deposits, this level of contraction is much more subdued when compared to other banking panics. Further research will aim to uncover the characteristics of borrowing versus non-borrowing institutions. Interest cost 3 percent for the first three months, and rises by .5 percentage points per month until reaching 6 percent 6 percent accrued to the clearing house member bank that held the certificate --NYCH as intermediary.
Weekly Balance Sheet Items
Collateral
State and municipal bonds, commercial paper, other securities.
Commercial paper, bills receivable, other securities.
Discount on collateral
State and municipals at 90 percent, commercial paper, other securities at 75 percent
The standard discount on all securities was 75 percent. Discounts were smaller on US Treasury, state and municipal securities, but those assets were rarely used in practice.
Transferability
Emergency currency could pass between banks as repayment for deposits, and could be issued to individual depositors. However, it did not serve as final payment at the New York Clearing House.
Clearing house loan certificates could only pass as final payment between NYCH member banks. It was not designed as a substitute form of cash payment in New York City.
Issued by:
National Currency Association supported by United States Treasury New York Clearing House (effectively, its membership)
Classification as currency
Emergency currency had all the characteristics of national bank notes except that the collateral backing emergency currency was less restricted than the collateral requirements for national bank notes (US Treasury Debt issues only).
New York Clearing House was unequivocal that only national bank notes could be issued as a currency;
if CHLCs circulated outside the NYCH membership, the 10 percent tax on state bank notes may have been triggered, it was feared.
* Membership in the Federal Reserve System or a commitment to join the Federal Reserve System was a necessary condition for membership in a National Currency Association. 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 Currency Emergency currency outstanding (right axis)
Note: shaded areas indicate crisis periods Sources: Friedman and Schwartz (1970) 
